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Resources 
In 1972 over 16 ,l+OO commercial and private users sought the 
supreme "white water" experience by travers�ng the Grand Canyon, or a 
portion of it, by moons of inflatable rubber boats. This compares with 
372 in 1962 alld 70 in 1955. Although Grand Canyon represents one of the 
most spectacular wilderness experiences, similar explosions in visitor use 
are reported ii1 the High Sierra, the Salmon and Snake Rivers of Idaho, and 
hundreds of miles of wilderness trails and rivers in the National Park and 
National Forest systems. This trend is causing considerable distress for 
naturalists and environmentalists interested in Wilderness preservati on, 
and for National Park and Forest Service administrators caught in the 
cross currents of political pressure to make public lands freely available 
to the citizenry while attempting to maintain such lands in some approxi­
mation to their natural state. 
Visitor use of the National Parks in general, although increasing, 
has not kept pace with growth in the use of the more primitive areas, a::; 
mountain climbing, b<ickpacking and river running have become popular 
activities that engage remote public lands never previously used for 
recreational purPoses by more than an insignificant segment of the popula­
tio<1. The contrast between growth in visits to developed park centers 
and to more rugged areas is illustrated in Chart 1 for visitor use of Grand 
Canyon. While total visits to Grand Canyon nearly doubled, 1960-1970, 
Colorado River excursions increased about 50 times. 
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Economic analysis of recreational lands has been concerned primarily 
with the principles (Krutilla, 1967) and techniques (Carlin, 1968;Fisher, 
Krutilla and Cicchetti, 1972; Hearse, 1968; Hoch,1962) of allocating and 
valuing land for recreational or preservational as against developed 
industrial uses. For example, should Hells Canyon or Grand Canyon be 
flooded behind hydroelectric dams or preserved as scenic resources? Formal 
treatments of the dynamic and uncertainty aspects of this allocation 
problem, with particular emphasis on the relative irreversibility of 
decisions to flood or otherwise destroy whole ecosystems through industrial 
development, have been provided recently by Fisher, Krutilla, and Cicchetti 
(1972) and by Arrow and Fisher (1973). These contributions do not deal 
with the'pr�blem of managing, developing,and rationing the use of re­
sources already allocated to recreational uses, although some studies do 
touch upon the problem (for example, Hoch, 1962, discusses and recommends 
license fees for park users). 
In what follows, the familiar tools of control theory and stationary 
general equilibrium theory will be used to st"dy a model that captures 
certain stylized characteristics of public recreational resources. These 
characteristics include external crowding diseconomies in consumption, 
deterioration effects of resource use, the.capacity of the resource for 
ecological adjustment to (or recovery from) use, and the public-good 
aspect of the quality, beauty, or "natu�alness" of the resource. Several 
types of equilibria will be illustrated and compared: An optimal control 
solution, with and without administrative cost, and a corresponding free 
use competitive soluti6n; and stationary state competitive solutions for 
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undeveloped and developed access technologies, and an optimal solution 
with administrative cost. An illustration is given wher;eby investment in 
an easier-access technology produces crowding and resource deterioration 
J 
to the point where all users are made worse. off. The administrative cost 
of overlaying direct controls as a remedy may cause further social losses, 
or, in any case, be worse than leaving the resource in its orginal state 
of high-cost access. This suggests the possibility that rationing by 
deliberately increasing (or not decreasing) the cost of access to 
scenic resources may be society 1 s best option. Al though this appears 
somewhat counterintuitive there are many institutional examples of a 
scarce resource being rationed by the imposition of artificial costs. Public 
.toilet facilities nearly always ration tissue paper and towels through 
dispensers designed to raise the cost of transacting for each unit. One 
imagines this design evolving from a great deal of experience with ex-
cessive waste from simple, more convenient dispensing devices. Similarly, 
the problem of overfishing for Pacific salmon has been alleviated in part 
by prohibiting the use of traps that clearly represent the most efficient 
capture technology, Requirements that oars rather than motors be used 
on wild river fl!>ats, that jeeps and trail bikes be prohibited in wilderness 
areas, and that certain park roads be left unpaved or restrictecl to four-
wheel clrive vehicles, may represent relatively efficient rationing 
techniques. Such rationing devices not only reduce crowding, and ecosystem 
damage; they also restrict use to those whose preferences ar� strong enough 
to overcome substantial cost of transacting, and in this sense the scarce 
resource is allocatecl to its more highly valued uses. 
Concepts and Assumptions 
Consider a scenic or wilderness recreational resource to be 
represented in the abstract by a stock, Q, of pleasurable homogeneous 
services. Real world prototypes would be the Grand Canyon, Yosemite 
and Glacial National Parks or any of the Wild Areas contained in the 
National Forest system. In the "natural'1 state, i.e. "undisturbed" by 
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man, Q is generated by an ecosystem which is boldly assumed to be governed 
by a differential equation, 
(1) dQ/dt g(Q) • g'(Q) < 0, g "(Q) < 0 , for Q >- 0, 
g(Q) = 0, 
where Q is the natural state equilibrium. This borders on an offensive 
oversimplification of reality, but serves to capture the idea that there 
exist natural biological and geological forces by which a scenic resource 
develops in the "undisturbed" state. Also, the stage is set for the beauty 
or wildness of the resource to be modified by man1s utilization of it. In 
particular, if the stock is reduced to some Q < Q,natural forces will 
generate recovery so long as the utilization (consumption) rate is below 
g(Q) • Figure 1 illustrates the natural stai:e equilibrium, Q At Q < Q 
if the resource is consumed at a rate q < g(Q), it will recov er  at the net 
rate g(Q) - q until dQ/dt � g(Q') - q = O. 
It is assumecl that the natural resoUrce resides in an economy which 
produces two goods. There is a normal or ordinary good (like corn or meat) 
produced and consumed at the rate q1 , while consumer exposure to the
natural resource is produced at the rate q2 • Exposure to the natural 
resource affects consumer taste in three distinct ways: (1) q� enters the 
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utility function as an ordinary private good just as does q1. Consumer use 
of the resource (as measurecl,for example, in visitor�use days) is variable, 
controllable, and excludable so that intensity of use is a private activity. 
(2) Total consumption by all users enters the utility function of each 
' 
consumer on the assumption that crowding, or merely the presence of other 
users, even in modest numbers, detracts from .the pleasure of scenic or 
wilderness resources. A dramatic example of external diseconomy on Colorado 
River excursions is the recent epidemic of dysentery (New York Times, 1972). 
k k Thus if q2 is the kth individual1s consumption,£ qa enters the utility 
k=l 
function of each of n consumers. Assuming, as we shall, identical utility 
functions, q2 is the common consumption rate, an� nq2 is total consumption. 
(3) The stock of services (Q) represented by the resource enters each 
utility function as a public good measure of the quality or character of 
the resource. This is the case �hether or not one assumes identical utility 
functions. 
The utilitv function is then of the form um = um (q� , q� , {! � , Q) 
. 1 k=l for consumer m, or u = u(q1 , q2,nq2 , Q) when an economy of n identical 
individuals is postulated,2 In the analysis of this paper, u will be assumed 
to be concave and additively separable,
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(2) u = "u1 (q1) + u2 (q:) + u3 (nq2) + u4 (Q) 
u; > 0, u; > O, u; < 0 u� > 0 , 
uj' < O, j = 1, 2, 3, 4 . 
A simple homogeneous productive input, available in the amount L, 
is allocated L1 units to producing q1 and L2 to producing q2, i.e. 
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(3) L = L\ + L2 
(4) ql c t1(t1) , i"' 1,2 
where the production functions £1 are assumed increasing and concave, 
fi_, > o, £�.s; o, i = 1,2. 
The effect of using the resource is assumed to cause deterioration at a 
time rate which is an increasing convex function of total consumption, 
h(nqa) ' h' > a. h"''>- 0 Hence changes in the net stock of services 
provided by the resource are described by the differential equation, 
(5) dQ/dt = g(Q) - h(nq2). 
It may be instructive to relate the technology functions, g(Q)1 
h(nq2) tp· particular types of recreaticnal resources. A "pure" scenic 
resource such as the Painted Desert, as viewed from U.S. 66, or the Grand 
Canyon as viewed from the North or South rims (insofar as they are merely 
resources viewed at a distance) would not be subject to det.erioration, and 
would therefore be characterized by specifying h(nq2) � O, and g'(Q) = - oo 
i.e., Q = Q. The specification g'(Q) � - oo m�rely states that geological 
change in these resources is negligible in contemporary time, and q is fixed 
and independent of resource utilization, But note th3t crowding, nq2 '• is 
still in the utility function, and such co.nsiderations may detract from the 
viewing pleasure of a fixed landscape. 
The Grand Canyon as vie"1ed from the inner gorge, as part of a Colorado 
River experience (and similarly for Hell's Canyon on the Snake River), is a 
scenic resource requiring direct physical contact, One has only to imagine over 
16,000 people floatirg 225 miles of the Colo:cado River from Lees Ferry to Diamond 
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Creek in 1972 -- an area totally without sleepin& or sanitary facilities 
to appreciate the effect of such use on the terrain, flora and fauna of the 
River and its immediate envi't'ons, Clearly a deterioration function h(nq :;i ) , 
perhaps with high inelasticity, may apply. Furthermore, the growth or 
, 
restoration function, g(Q), might be highly elastic for the arid ecosystem 
of the inner gorge so that recovery from a disturbed state may be Very 
slow. On the other hand,the more lush Allagash region of Northern Maine 
or parts of the New York State Forest Preserve may recover mare quickly 
from disturbances in their wilderness ecosystems. 
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A Conventional Control Theory Analysis 
If u measures instantaneous social welfare and is the socia 1 
rate of time preference, the standard control problem is to choose 
[L1 (t), � (t)] so as to maximize J0 ue -Otdt subject to (3)-(5).
The current value Hamilton-Lagrange criterion is 
H = u1 [£1 (L1)] + u2 [f2(L2)] + u3[nf2(L2)] + u4(Q) 
+ u ( g(Q) - h(nf;a(�)] ) +A. (L - 11 - L�:) 
and along a maximizing path the conditions 
oH 
OLi 
= 0 , i c: 1, 2, and U. = 6 µ. - � 
aQ 
must be satisfied. 
By substitution from (3) and (4), the State of the system is described 
oy 
(6a) ( u; [fa(L;i)] +nu; [n�(L;.)] - nu.h"[nf:a (L2)] )1 u; [f1(L - �)]
= t; (L - l.:i) I £; (L;i) 
(6b) ,; • µ [6 - g'(Q)] - u; .(Q) 
(6c) Q • g(Q) - h[nf,(L,)] 
and lim 
t � • 
e- Ot µ.(t) � 0 , lim 
t � • 
e -Ot u.(t) Q(t) = O • 
Equation (6a) defines a £.unction L;a � (µ.) with 
where 
(7) dl..a I du. = nf; h' I J < o 
J = u; f; + u; (£;)2 + (u; +nu; - nµ.h') f;" - µ.h" (nf�)2 
+ u; (£;):.a+ u;" (nf;)2 < O, 
since£[ .:f 0, '\' > 0, uj < 0 ,  h""� O, and from (6a), 
(u; + nu
.
� - nµh') = u; £;ft; > 0 , Then the differential 
equations (6b) and (6c), with L2 = L2(\J.), describe time paths 
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Q = Q*(t) , U = u*(t) • The motion of the system in state space (Q,µ) is 
characterized by the usual phase diagram of Figure 2. 
From (6c) , the set of points { (Q, µ) \ � "' 0
.
} • 
with the property that the stock of resource services is stationary, is 
given by 
_, 
(8) Q • g (h(nf,[L,( µ)]J), 
This function is strictly increasing since 
dµ. /dQ jQ= 0 = g'/nh'f; (dL2/du.) > 0, as shown in Figure 2. 
Also from (6c) , aQ / OQ c g'(Q) < 0 • At any point to the right (left) of 
the set [(Q , µ) I Q = 01 the recovery rate of the resource is below 
(above) its deterioration rate and the stock of resource services will 
decline (increase). 
Along an optimizing path,(6b) requires the subjective instantaneous 
unit value of the resource stock , u� (Q), to equal total interest on the 
rnarket value of a unit of the stock,µ. [ 13 - g'(Q)], less capital gains on
the stock , � Total interest includes the time preference rate, 13 
and -g'(Q) , an "own" ecological rate of interest which measures the 
marginal cost, in terms of reduced natural growth, of consuming the re-
source stock. The set of points f (Q, �>I i� "' 0)1 with the property that 
the implicit price of the resource stock is stationary, is given by 
u; (Q) 
(9) u - '-"'(Q) 
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a strictly decreasing function since 
dµ I dQ I• _ 0 = (� + µ g"') I (6 - g") < O, as shown in Figure 2. µ -
Also otl / Q\J."' 6 - g' > 0 and for points above (below) the set 
[(Q,µ) jµ "'0 ),the price of the resource stock must be increasing 
(decreasing), 
t.. stationary state equilibrium point (Q''• µ.*) is shown in Figure 2. 
If the initial resource stock is Q , the corresponding optimal initial 
price is µ and the equilibrium path is along the d3shed line passing 
through (Q, ii:) and (Q*,U.•�) • 
If we assume that lim L 2 (µ,) 0 in (6a) , lim 
Li .... 
f.(L.) = 0) 
0 i i µ �. 
-' 
. _, 
lim h(q) c O, and lim g (Q) 
q .... 0.. Q ... 0 
c Q , then from (8) lim g (b[nf2 [12 (u.) )) )-;'- Q
µ ..... "' 
.as shown in Figure 2. If we let Lt a L�(O), where 0 < L� < L, be 
the amount of input L2 used when there is free access to the resource, 
then we must have 
Qt= g-
1 
(hfnf [L
t]1) < Q, as shown. 2 8 . From (9) if lim u:(Q) = O, 8nd Q � 
since g'(Q) < 0 for all Q? O,we must have 'µ. _. 0 as Q ... "' and if 
lim u: (Q) = m 1then we must have µ. ... "' as Q ...  0,. as shown in Figure 2.
Q � 0 
' 
Thus an intersection point at Q* , where Q
t < Q* < Q , will exist. 
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Reduction to a Model of Decentralized Competition 
The control model reduces to a model of decentralized competition 
if we set � = 0 , nu3 = 0 in equations (6a) (6c). That is1 there exists 
no free mark�t price for using the free-access natural resource and each 
consumer, following his own self-interest, fails to take account of the 
crowding diseconomies produced by his own consumption of the natural 
resource. 
The competitive time path is then defined by (6c) and 
(10) u;[f2(L2)J 
u,'[f, (L - L,)J 
t;(L -L2) 
f� (L;) 
At a stationary competitive equilibrium Q 
(11) Q. g-' (" (n f, [f., n) 
with Q < qt • 
Further Analysis of the Stationary State 
i., � s 0 , we will have 
The stationary state is defined by (6a) - (6c) when Q = µ "' 0 
The state of the economy can then be representecl in (q1 , q2) space in the 
usual manner of static general equilibrium. This is accomplished by noting 
that (6b) and (6cY can be combined in the form 
u� (Q) 
_, 
u; (g [h (nq,) ]} 
µ 6 - g'(Q) 6 - g'(g- [h(nq,)]} 
In (q1 , q2) space, using (3) �nd (4), and transforming (6a), equilibrium 
is defined by 
(12) -
u; (q�) 
ui (q£') +nu; (nq�) -
nh '(nq�) u.; {g -
1
[h(nq:) ]} 
6 -g'{g -1(h(nq�)]l 
(13) �-l (q�) + £;1 (q�) L 
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fl
'[f�
l (<j�) J
_, * t;[f<! (q.;i)] 
Condition (12) states the familiar requirement that the social marginal rate 
of substitution equal the marginal rate of transformati6n, while (13) 
requires the economy to operate on its production possibility frontier. 
The left side of (12) is the slope of an indifference curve adjusted for 
the external effect of Q and nq;a,, This is seen most directly by letting
the time preference rate Ii "' 0 • Then the left side of (12) is the slope 
of. an indifference curve defined by 
_, u1(q1) +�(q:;i) +u3(nq2) +u4fg [h(nq2)]} constant, 
_, 
where Q = g [h ( nq
2
)] is determined by equilibrium of the resource stock. 
However, decentraiized competitive consumers of the natural resource do 
not have private incentive to consider the components u� and u4 when making 
their consumption decis'ions. They perceive a substit1;tion rate u; /u; 
and therefore the competitive equilibri. um (q1 , q,.,) as defined by 
(12) 
(13) 
u; <t11) 
u; CG:;i 
t;[f;
1 <Ci1>)
t;rf;
1 cq.,) J. 
_ 1 " _1 ,.. £1 (q1) +f2 (q2) "'L .
In Figure 3 the point C represents a competitive equilibrium, while 
p represents the socia'l optimum. The indifference curve Jp corresponds to 
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maximum utility, taking full account of all social opportunity costs. 
At P, the indifference curve Ip corresponds to the set of substitutions 
perceived by the individual as he views the free-access natural resource. 
At ·any point in the commodity space, I will have a greater algebraic slope 
than J, since g < O, h' < 0, u_1 <01u� < 0 implies 
u, u; > -
u; u; + nu� � 6 - g, 
In a free market q1 would exchange for Cb at the rate - f� /£; < - u{ /u; at 
P,and each consumer would substitute q1 for q2 -- in the myopic belief that 
his position would be improved -- until the point C was reached But at 
C everyone is worse off than at P. 
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Optimal Control and the Cost of Administration 
Society's choice between P and C in Figure 3, or between stocks Q* and 
Qfin Figure 2, would be simple if there were no costs associated "With 
achieving the control solution. Everyone would benefit from, and would 
favor, intervention to impose the allocation represented by P in Figure 3. 
But suppose there is a cost to administering this locally efficient 
allocation. This cost may arise from the need to compute and charge the 
resource price µ.�< (t) and the congestion charge 4 • or to compute and enforce 
an optimal quota q� (t) for rationing access to the natural resource. In 
particular, suppose the administrative machinery requires the fixed ex-
penditure of La units of the productive input, leaving L - La available 
for direct 'productive allocation. This will shift the resource stock 
equilibrium set to the right, say to { (Q,u) I Q"' Ola , as indicated by 
the broken curve in Figure 2. An equilibrium path will now pass through 
the intersecti on at Qa, the stationary state equilibrium optimal stock , 
taking into account administrative cost. In Figure 3, the effect of 
administrative cost is to lower the productio
_
n possibility frontier from 
S tO Sa' and the optimal stationary state solution is at A This� 
occur, as illustrated in Figure 3,at a utility level J8 below Jc Hence 
the competitive free access solution might be supc rior to the control 
solution net of administrative cost. In this interpretation La represents 
cost in excess of any similar cost, suCh as transactions cost, required t o  
support o r  maintain free markets. 
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Rationing by Costly Access or Non-Development 
National Park (Forest, Monument) administrators are not normally 
confronted with a simple choice between optimal controlled access versus 
free competiljive access to a scenic or wilde.rness resource. Decisions 
usually take the form of how to permit development or which access 
technologies are to be permitted. Typically there is the question of 
whether or not roads to a scenic area are to be paved, or whether trails in a 
wilderness area are to be closed to motorized traffic. Such decisions can 
by stylized in our model by asking if it pays society to invest in an 
easier-access technology. Should a road be built across the Escalante 
River to Lake Powell permitting automobile- access· to a hitherto isolatecl 
scenic area accessible only by backpacking or horseback? Should jeep 
trails be closed to ali motorized traffic in �he Uncompahgre National 
Forest? Shoulcl the use of outboard motors be prohibited on Colorado 
River excursions through Cataract Canyon or Grand Canyon? These are typical 
policy decisions facing public lands administrators. 
Phrasing the question in this way rather than as a problem concerned 
only with controlling access is particularly appropriate since the need 
for limiting access is frequently a consequence ·of an earlier decision 
to develop a natuial resource by making it more accessible. This raises 
the question of whether a costly form of primitive access, or non-develop-
ment in general, is not preferable to overlaying administrative controls 
upon investment in an easier-access technology as a means of undoing with 
the left hand that which the right hand has already done, 
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Suppose that by incurring a fixed input cost equal to L� units per period, 
the production technology q2 = max [O, F2(L:.i- L�)] can be substituted for the 
technology q2 = f:;i(L2), where F2(0) = o, F; > O,f;'�oand � (�) < F2(l.,i- L�) 
beyond some level of �(see Figure 4). In terms of production possibilities 
society can increase its opportunity set over some region by producing less 
q1 and investing the input savings in a substitute means of producing q2• In
Figure 5 the frontier of this substitute set is represented by S'. 
A possible effect of the investment of L� units of input, or the fore­
gone output, f, {L) - f (L - �) units of q , in developing the natural re-' " ' 
source is illustrated in Figure 5. Initially the free access equilibrium 
is at c. Then society invests in a motorized technology yielding the 
frontiers'. The resulting sacrifice of q1 output permits an enlargecl set 
of q2 co�sumption opportunities, and society moves to the new stationary 
sta"te c'. If at C the utility net of external effects is represented by an 
indifference curve Jc passing to the northeast (southwest) of c'as shown, 
then society is unambiguously worse (better) off as a result of the develop­
ment expenditure. 5 Note, however, that at C each ccnsumer perceives that 
an increase in production possibil:ities 'from S ·to 5' will permit him to 
improve his position by moving to indifference curves above Ic. Myopic
consumers may thus press for a change in public land policy that will· permit 
the technological change, but the consequent crowding and deterioration in 
resource quality may lead to dis�ppointing long-run levels of satisfaction. 
Such a process seems to portray actual experience in many instances of 
recreatimal land development. 
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After the movement from C to C', if the public authorities are 
pressured to intervene and set up the administrative bureaucracy to ration 
access, this will lower the production possibility set and society ends 
up at a point' such as O.� which might represent a still lower level of 
satisfaction even though the point is allocatively efficient. If such 
be the case it would be preferable, if somewhat paradoxical, to ration 
access by imposing higher cost access technology, S, an·cl letting com-
petition restore society to the state representecl by C. 
Footnotes 
* I am grateful to the National Science Foundation for research support. 
1
1t should be noted that £ 
k•l 
q� and Q may enter the Qtility function of 
consumer rn as externality variables with nonzero marginal effects even if 
q� = O. The Sierra Club member who never climbs Mt. McKinley may derive 
satisfaction from the knowledge that the largest North American mountain 
is relatively unspoiled, with few climbers littering its slopes. (He should, 
of course, also be wil�ing to pa·y for these satisfactions.) 
2
Alternatively, one could think of u as a welfare function depending on the 
per capita consumption rates (q1, q2), and wilderness quality, Q. In either 
c8se, as in most of the growth economics literature, we dodge the whole set 
of .complications introduced by conflicting subjective evaluations of the 
arguments of u • 
3Actditivity is neither very realistic nor strictly ·necessary to the anal-
ysis, but it very much simplifies the arithmetic by permitting us to deduce 
that the phase curves of Figu_re 2 are monotone. Alternatively we coUld 
postulate the more general utility functioh in the text, and thei1postulate 
monotonicity for the more general equilibrium state equations corresponding 
to (8) and (9) and illustrated in Figure 2. 
4 
If consumers are required to pay a visitor-use charge, e;i per day or 
other unit of use, then from (6a) and (10) free market allocations will be 
optimal if 9:a"' -
' 
nu, 
--,u, 
+ n 11.h' 
u'  
, "Where 
nu_�' 
U" > 0 ' is the congestion 
h' 
or crO"Wding toll, and !!Q,- > 0 is the rental rate for the resource u, 
services provided by the stock, Q In Figure 3) S:a is measured by the 
difference bet"Ween the slopes of I and J , or between I and S , at P p p . p 
so that for the consumer _c:;_ 
u; "'G:a + 
,­-'-· f' 
yieldL>� Uud�et equilibrinm at P. 
' 
=>This judgment ignores the time path of utility between equilibria and is 
based entirely on the comparative statics of Figure 5. 
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